Human capital accumulation and the evolution of overconfidence
Summary: This paper studies the evolution of overconfidence over a cohort's working life. To do this, the paper incorporates subjective assessments into a continuous time human capital accumulation model with a finite horizon. The main finding is that the processes of human capital accumulation, skill depreciation, and subjective assessments imply that overconfidence first increases and then decreases over the cohort's working life. In the absence of skill depreciation, overconfidence monotonically increases over the cohort's working life. The model generates four additional testable predictions. First, everything else equal, overconfidence peaks earlier in activities where skill depreciation is higher. Second, overconfidence is lower in activities where the distribution of income is more dispersed. Third, for a minority of individuals, overconfidence decreases over their working life. Fourth, overconfidence is lower with a higher market discount rate. The paper provides two applications of the model. It shows the model can help make sense of field data on overconfidence, experience, and trading activity in financial markets. The model can also explain experimental data on the evolution of overconfidence among poker and chess players.
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- Overconfidence and market efficiency with heterogeneous agents
- On rationally confident beliefs and rational overconfidence
- Evolution game analysis of the unbalance in human capital investment
- Worker overconfidence: Field evidence and implications for employee turnover and firm profits
- Simultaneous over- and underconfidence: Evidence from experimental asset markets
- Overconfidence and social signalling
- A model of rational bias in self-assessments
- Apparent overconfidence
- Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence, and common stock investment
- First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias
- Overconfidence in tournaments: evidence from the field
- The dynamic evolution of preferences
- What to maximize if you must
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