Overconfidence can improve an agent's relative and absolute performance in contests

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.11.040MaRDI QIDQ531399zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sandra Ludwig, Philipp C. Wichardt, Hanke Wickhorst

Publication date 29 April 2011

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.040

zbMATH Keywords

contestsoverconfidence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cited in

(4)

• Expectation-based loss aversion and rank-order tournaments
• Salesforce contract design, joint pricing and production planning with asymmetric overconfidence sales agent
• Overconfidence and strategic behavior in elimination contests: implications for CEO selection
• How confidence heterogeneity shapes effort and performance in tournaments and contests

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