Overconfidence can improve an agent's relative and absolute performance in contests

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.11.040zbMATH Open1210.91067OpenAlexW1966873085MaRDI QIDQ531399FDOQ531399

Authors: Sandra Ludwig, Philipp C. Wichardt, Hanke Wickhorst 

Publication date: 29 April 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.040

zbMATH Keywords

contestsoverconfidence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cited In (2)

• Salesforce contract design, joint pricing and production planning with asymmetric overconfidence sales agent
• Expectation-based loss aversion and rank-order tournaments

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