An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard
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Publication:2411164
DOI10.3934/JIMO.2017020zbMath1415.91187OpenAlexW2560347173MaRDI QIDQ2411164
Wansheng Tang, Xiulan Wang, Yanfei Lan
Publication date: 20 October 2017
Published in: Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2017020
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