Double moral hayard, monitoring and the nature of contracts

DOI10.1007/S007120200002MaRDI QIDQ698213zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pradeep Agrawal

Publication date 5 August 2003

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s007120200002

zbMATH Keywords

transaction costsincentivescontractsrisk premium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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(5)

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• The employment contract when the firm can utilize a free resource
• An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard
• Robustness of a fixed-rent contract in a standard agency model
• How to build stable relationships between people who lie and cheat

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