Double moral hayard, monitoring and the nature of contracts

DOI10.1007/S007120200002zbMATH Open1016.91071OpenAlexW370233416MaRDI QIDQ698213FDOQ698213

Authors: Pradeep Agrawal 

Publication date: 5 August 2003

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s007120200002

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zbMATH Keywords

transaction costsincentivescontractsrisk premium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cited In (5)

• The employment contract when the firm can utilize a free resource
• An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard
• Robustness of a fixed-rent contract in a standard agency model
• How to build stable relationships between people who lie and cheat
• Uncertainty aversion and theory of incomplete contract

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