The employment contract when the firm can utilize a free resource

DOI10.1007/S00712-010-0114-7zbMath1229.91184OpenAlexW2022349566MaRDI QIDQ969641

Mikko Mustonen

Publication date: 7 May 2010

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0114-7

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardcontractbasic researchopen sourcefree resource

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• On the Role of Uncertainty in the Risk-Incentives Tradeoff
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives

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