The employment contract when the firm can utilize a free resource

DOI10.1007/S00712-010-0114-7MaRDI QIDQ969641zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mikko Mustonen

Publication date 7 May 2010

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0114-7

zbMATH Keywords

basic researchcontractfree resourcemoral hazardopen source

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• On the Role of Uncertainty in the Risk-Incentives Tradeoff

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