Overconfidence and moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.04.001zbMATH Open1274.91279OpenAlexW3125438445MaRDI QIDQ645649FDOQ645649

Authors: Leonidas Enrique de la Rosa 

Publication date: 10 November 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.au.dk/ws/files/38642293/accepted_manuscript.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardheterogeneous beliefsoverconfidence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites Work

• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Cursed Equilibrium
• Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market
• Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation
• The Positive Effects of Biased Self-Perceptions in Firms*
• Overconfidence and moral hazard

Cited In (22)

• Study on manager's stock compensation of listed stock company based on overconfidence
• Polyperiod optimal incentive contract in capital market under the condition of overconfidence
• Overconfidence and timing of entry
• Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
• Inequity-averse agents' deserved concerns under the linear contract: a social network setting
• Salesforce contract design, joint pricing and production planning with asymmetric overconfidence sales agent
• Overconfidence and ethical contracts
• Adverse selection, heterogeneous beliefs, and evolutionary learning
• Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment
• Pessimistic information gathering
• CEO Overconfidence and Earnings Management: Evidence from Property-Liability Insurers' Loss Reserves
• Salience bias and overwork
• Optimal incentives schemes under \textit{Homo moralis} preferences
• Correlation neglect, incentives, and welfare
• The Positive Effects of Biased Self-Perceptions in Firms*
• Life insurance and life settlement markets with overconfident policyholders
• Overstatement and rational market expectation
• CEO overconfidence and innovation
• Overconfidence and moral hazard
• Imposing commitment to rein in overconfidence in learning
• Investment timing, agency and overconfidence
• Optimal overconfidence in the presence of information manipulation

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