Overconfidence and moral hazard

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.001zbMath1274.91279OpenAlexW3125438445MaRDI QIDQ645649

Leonidas Enrique de la Rosa

Publication date: 10 November 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.au.dk/ws/files/38642293/accepted_manuscript.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardheterogeneous beliefsoverconfidence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

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Cites Work

• Overconfidence and moral hazard
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation
• Cursed Equilibrium
• The Positive Effects of Biased Self-Perceptions in Firms*
• Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market