Overconfidence and moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.04.001MaRDI QIDQ645649zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Leonidas Enrique de la Rosa

Publication date 10 November 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://pure.au.dk/ws/files/38642293/accepted_manuscript.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardheterogeneous beliefsoverconfidence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Recommendations

• Polyperiod optimal incentive contract in capital market under the condition of overconfidence
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Cites work

• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Cursed Equilibrium
• Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market
• Overconfidence and moral hazard
• Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation
• The Positive Effects of Biased Self-Perceptions in Firms*
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values

Cited in

(22)

• Study on manager's stock compensation of listed stock company based on overconfidence
• Polyperiod optimal incentive contract in capital market under the condition of overconfidence
• Overconfidence and timing of entry
• Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
• Inequity-averse agents' deserved concerns under the linear contract: a social network setting
• Salesforce contract design, joint pricing and production planning with asymmetric overconfidence sales agent
• Overconfidence and ethical contracts
• Adverse selection, heterogeneous beliefs, and evolutionary learning
• Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment
• Pessimistic information gathering
• CEO Overconfidence and Earnings Management: Evidence from Property-Liability Insurers' Loss Reserves
• Optimal incentives schemes under \textit{Homo moralis} preferences
• Salience bias and overwork
• Correlation neglect, incentives, and welfare
• Overstatement and rational market expectation
• Life insurance and life settlement markets with overconfident policyholders
• The Positive Effects of Biased Self-Perceptions in Firms*
• CEO overconfidence and innovation
• Overconfidence and moral hazard
• Investment timing, agency and overconfidence
• Imposing commitment to rein in overconfidence in learning
• Optimal overconfidence in the presence of information manipulation

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