Life insurance and life settlement markets with overconfident policyholders
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Publication:2211484
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105093zbMATH Open1454.91183OpenAlexW2603568522MaRDI QIDQ2211484FDOQ2211484
Authors: Hanming Fang, Z. N. Wu 
Publication date: 11 November 2020
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w23286.pdf
Recommendations
- Life insurance settlement and the monopolistic insurance market
- Asymmetric information in secondary insurance markets: evidence from the life settlements market
- Overconfidence in the markets for lemons
- Optimal life-insurance selection and purchase within a market of several life-insurance providers
- The Pareto-optimal design of term life insurance contracts
Cites Work
- Regression analysis of count data
- Consumption Over the Life Cycle
- Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
- Actuarial Modelling of Claim Counts
- Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence, and common stock investment
- Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
- Overconfidence and moral hazard
- The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance
- Commitment, flexibility, and optimal screening of time inconsistency
- A theory of intermediated investment with hyperbolic discounting investors
- Naïveté-based discrimination
- Estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution using mortgage notches
Cited In (2)
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