Correlation neglect, incentives, and welfare

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109171zbMATH Open1442.91055OpenAlexW3020801732MaRDI QIDQ777701FDOQ777701

Authors: Andreas Klümper, Matthias Kräkel 

Publication date: 7 July 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109171

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zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionmoral hazardbehavioral contract theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Overconfidence and moral hazard
• Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation

Cited In (3)

• BASE RATE NEGLECT FOR THE WEALTH OF INTERACTING PEOPLE
• Correlation Made Simple: Applications to Salience and Regret Theory
• Attention misallocation, social welfare and policy implications

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