Correlation and relative performance evaluation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.11.016MaRDI QIDQ665451zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pierre Fleckinger

Publication date 5 March 2012

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.016

zbMATH Keywords

correlationmoral hazardrelative vs joint performance evaluation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
• Common shocks and relative compensation
• Contracts with endogenous information
• Implementing action profiles when agents collude
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
• Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
• Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: An overview
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
• Relative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firm
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
• The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents

Cited in

(14)

• Equilibrium design in an \(n\)-player quadratic game
• Incentives, Compensation, and Social Welfare
• Relative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firm
• Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts
• Relative performance evaluation and contract externalities
• Robust performance evaluation of independent agents
• Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference
• Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation
• Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• On the value of relative comparisons in firms
• Correlation neglect, incentives, and welfare
• Relative performance evaluation for dynamic contracts in a large competitive market
• Communication and Cooperation in repeated games
• Motivational ratings

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