Correlation and relative performance evaluation
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Publication:665451
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.11.016zbMATH Open1258.91120OpenAlexW2045996657MaRDI QIDQ665451FDOQ665451
Authors: Pierre Fleckinger 
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.016
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Cites Work
- Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
- Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
- Contracts with endogenous information
- Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
- Stopping agents from ``cheating
- Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
- Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
- The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
- Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: An overview
- Implementing action profiles when agents collude
- Collusion and the organization of delegated expertise
- Relative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firm
- Common shocks and relative compensation
Cited In (11)
- Communication and cooperation in repeated games
- Relative performance evaluation in a multi-plant firm
- Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts
- Robust performance evaluation of independent agents
- Relative performance evaluation and contract externalities
- Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference
- Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation
- Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- On the value of relative comparisons in firms
- Equilibrium design in an \(n\)-player quadratic game
- Incentives, Compensation, and Social Welfare
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