Implementing action profiles when agents collude
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Recommendations
- Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
- Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
- Collusion, renegotiation and implementation
- Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
- Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
- Far-sighted strong equilibrium and oligopoly
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Renegotiation in repeated games
- Stopping agents from ``cheating
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
Cited in
(13)- Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage
- Collusion constrained equilibrium
- Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
- Collusion and discrimination in organizations
- Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
- Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments
- Stopping agents from ``cheating
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
- Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
- Fighting collusion: an implementation theory approach
- Correlation and relative performance evaluation
- The optimality of team contracts
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