Implementing action profiles when agents collude

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2235MaRDI QIDQ1357585zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sandro Brusco

Publication date 10 June 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2235

zbMATH Keywords

collusion-proofprincipal multiple agents problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Collusion, renegotiation and implementation
• Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
• Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing
• Far-sighted strong equilibrium and oligopoly
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents

Cited in

(13)

• Two-agent collusion-proof implementation with correlation and arbitrage
• Collusion constrained equilibrium
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
• Collusion and discrimination in organizations
• Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents
• Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
• Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
• Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
• Fighting collusion: an implementation theory approach
• Correlation and relative performance evaluation
• The optimality of team contracts

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