Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments

DOI10.1007/S00712-010-0131-6zbMATH Open1194.91104OpenAlexW2076217716WikidataQ122899599 ScholiaQ122899599MaRDI QIDQ5962012FDOQ5962012

Authors: Oliver Gürtler 

Publication date: 16 September 2010

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0131-6

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zbMATH Keywords

heterogeneityhomogeneityrepeated gametournamentpartial collusioncomplete collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• Rank-order tournaments and selection.
• Sabotage in dynamic tournaments
• Multi-battle contests
• Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps
• HELPING AND SABOTAGING IN TOURNAMENTS
• On sabotage in collective tournaments
• Collusion and discrimination in organizations

Cited In (4)

• Standardization and the stability of collusion
• Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments -- an experimental study
• Managerial collusive behavior under asymmetric incentive schemes
• On sabotage in collective tournaments

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