Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments

DOI10.1007/S00712-010-0131-6MaRDI QIDQ5962012zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Oliver Gürtler

Publication date 16 September 2010

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-010-0131-6

zbMATH Keywords

heterogeneityhomogeneityrepeated gametournamentpartial collusioncomplete collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Competition and networks of collaboration
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Cites work

• Collusion and discrimination in organizations
• Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps
• HELPING AND SABOTAGING IN TOURNAMENTS
• Multi-battle contests
• On sabotage in collective tournaments
• Rank-order tournaments and selection.
• Sabotage in dynamic tournaments
• Strategy and dynamics in contests

Cited in

(5)

• Standardization and the stability of collusion
• Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments -- an experimental study
• Managerial collusive behavior under asymmetric incentive schemes
• The threat of sabotage and collusion in tournaments
• On sabotage in collective tournaments

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