Standardization and the stability of collusion

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00010-XMaRDI QIDQ1128590zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Luca Lambertini, Sougata Poddar, Dan Sasaki

Publication date 13 August 1998

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00010-X

zbMATH Keywords

critical discount factorproduct innovationRJVs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Collusion, efficiency, and dominant strategies
• Collusion constrained equilibrium
• On the feasibility of maximal collusion
• Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
• Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
• Collusion, discounting and dynamic games
• Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments
• Complete versus partial collusion in competing coalitions
• Collusion properties of values
• Collusion and Price Rigidity

Cites work

• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Intertemporal Product Choice and Its Effects on Collusive Firm Behavior
• On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies
• Prisoners' dilemma in duopoly (super) games

Cited in

(11)

• Collusion properties of values
• A differential game approach to investment in product differentiation
• Compatibility, network effects, and collusion
• Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities
• Dynamic R\&D with spillovers: competition vs cooperation
• Optimal compatibility in systems markets
• Collusion, renegotiation and implementation
• PRIVATE AND SOCIAL INCENTIVES TOWARDS INVESTMENT IN PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
• Collusion and customization
• Note on collusion with network externalities in price versus quantity competition
• Cartel stability in a delivered pricing oligopoly

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