Complete versus partial collusion in competing coalitions

DOI10.1142/S021919891540006XMaRDI QIDQ5245036zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Omkar D. Palsule-Desai

Publication date 1 April 2015

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919891540006x

zbMATH Keywords

coalitioncompetitiongame theoryintensity of collusionsharing rulesstability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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Cites work

• Bertrand colludes more than Cournot
• COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY
• Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game
• Competitively cost advantageous mergers and monopolization
• ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF COALITIONS
• Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions
• Putting free-riding to work: A partnership solution to the common-property problem
• Social and economic networks.
• Stable Cartels
• Surplus-sharing methods

Cited in

(5)

• Standardization and the stability of collusion
• On the feasibility of maximal collusion
• Impact of equity and equality on stability and collusion in a decentralized network
• Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining
• Stable cartel configurations and product differentiation: the case of multiple cartels

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