Coalition-proof information exchanges

DOI10.1007/BF01227436MaRDI QIDQ2564148zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors David A. Malueg, Shunichi O. Tsutsui

Publication date 7 January 1997

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227436

zbMATH Keywords

coalition-proof equilibriuminformation exchangeNash equilibriumthree-firm oligopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Coalition formation of oligopolistic firms for information exchange
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
• Information Sharing in Oligopoly
• Coalition-proof Bertrand equilibria
• Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly.

Cites work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
• Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
• Strategic Information Revelation

Cited in

(7)

• Coalition formation of oligopolistic firms for information exchange
• Information leakage forces cooperation
• Informational Alliances
• Information sharing networks in linear quadratic games
• Complete versus partial collusion in competing coalitions
• Secure Distributed Information Exchange
• Robust results on the sharing of firm-specific information: incentives and welfare effects

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