Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game
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Publication:532759
DOI10.1007/s00182-010-0244-8zbMath1211.91021OpenAlexW1971456882MaRDI QIDQ532759
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://soar-ir.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/2627/files/Coalition-proof_equilibria_voluntary_participation_game.pdf
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Cites Work
- The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy
- On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
- On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
- A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good
- Coalition-proofness and dominance relations
- Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
- Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
- The Ratio Equilibria and the Core of the Voting Game G(N, W) in a Public Goods Economy
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