On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0656zbMath0918.90143MaRDI QIDQ1288246

Sang-Seung Yi

Publication date: 4 August 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0656

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium set; Pareto efficient frontier

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

Related Items

COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A NORMAL-FORM GAME AND ITS SUBGAMES, Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game, Secure implementation in allotment economies, Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes, Coalition-proof supply function equilibria in oligopoly., Pareto refinements of pure-strategy equilibria in games with public and private information, Coalition-proofness and dominance relations, Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games, Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance, Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in a strategic pure exchange game of bads

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Equilibria in a model with partial rivalry
• Coalition-proof equilibrium
• Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
• Market Structure and Innovation
• Finding All n-Firm Cournot Equilibria
• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities