Equilibria in a model with partial rivalry

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2203zbMath0883.90128OpenAlexW2010679956MaRDI QIDQ1363532

Hideo Konishi, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber

Publication date: 10 August 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2203

zbMATH Keywords

existence of a pure strategy strong Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

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