CONGESTION GAMES AND POTENTIALS RECONSIDERED
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Publication:4816625
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Cites Work
- A Tiebout theorem
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
- Congestion models and weighted Bayesian potential games
- Equilibria in a model with partial rivalry
- Minimality of consistent solutions for strategic games, in particular for potential games
- Potential games
- Strong equilibrium in congestion games
Cited In (34)
- An axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept
- A game-theoretical model of the landscape theory
- On Satisfiability Games and the Power of Congestion Games
- Games with congestion-averse utilities
- Potential games with continuous player sets
- Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
- Weighted Boolean formula games
- Nonspecific networking
- The complexity of welfare maximization in congestion games
- An application of optimization theory to the study of equilibria for games: a survey
- Potential in congestion game with different types of vehicles
- Totally unimodular congestion games
- Computing pure Nash and strong equilibria in bottleneck congestion games
- Selfish routing with incomplete information
- Equilibrium and potential in coalitional congestion games
- A universal construction generating potential games
- Congestion games with capacitated resources
- Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium
- Rosenthal's potential and a discrete version of the Debreu-Gorman theorem
- On the convergence of multicast games in directed networks
- Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games.
- The cutting power of preparation
- A survey of static and dynamic potential games
- Solution-based congestion games
- Designing fast converging cost sharing methods for multicast transmissions
- A selective tour through congestion games
- Nash equilibria in all-optical networks
- Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games
- Equilibria in bottleneck games
- Informational Braess' paradox: the effect of information on traffic congestion
- Congestion games revisited
- Greediness and equilibrium in congestion games
- Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property
- Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness
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