Nonspecific networking

DOI10.3390/G2010087MaRDI QIDQ2344966zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jacques Durieu, Philippe Solal, Hans Haller

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g2010087

zbMATH Keywords

local interaction gamesnonspecific networkingsocial networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30)

Review text

Summary: A new model of strategic networking is developed and analyzed, where an agent's investment in links is nonspecific. The model comprises a large class of games which are both potential and super- or submodular games. We obtain comparative statics results for Nash equilibria with respect to investment costs for supermodular as well as submodular networking games. We also study supermodular games with potentials. We find that the set of potential maximizers forms a sublattice of the lattice of Nash equilibria and derive comparative statics results for the smallest and the largest potential maximizer. Finally, we provide a broad spectrum of applications from social interaction to industrial organization.

Recommendations

• Equilibria and efficiency loss in games on networks
• Nash networks with heterogeneous links
• Networks structure, equilibria, and adjustment dynamics in network games with nonhomogeneous players
• A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
• Networks and stability

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Cited in

(1)

• The formation of social groups under status concern

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