Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior

DOI10.1007/S001820400170MaRDI QIDQ1767470zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Burkhard C. Schipper

Publication date 11 March 2005

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22832

zbMATH Keywords

aggregate-taking strategyImitationlattice theoryprice-taking behaviorstochastic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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• Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior: theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust
• Strategic effects between price-takers and non-price-takers
• When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
• Nonspecific networking
• Economic Darwinism
• Games with strategic complements and substitutes
• Computing the Evolution of Walrasian Behaviour
• Unbeatable imitation
• Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes
• Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games
• The Walrasian output beats the market
• The evolutionary stability of optimism, pessimism, and complete ignorance
• Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms

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