When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
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Publication:2248904
DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0370-1zbMath1308.91030arXiv1301.5683OpenAlexW1539093482MaRDI QIDQ2248904
Burkhard C. Schipper, Jörg Oechssler, Peter Duersch
Publication date: 27 June 2014
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.5683
Related Items (2)
Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response ⋮ Repeated Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: The Stackleberg Variant
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