Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games

DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0302-XzbMATH Open1259.91002arXiv1003.4277OpenAlexW3123694393MaRDI QIDQ444136FDOQ444136

Burkhard C. Schipper, Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler

Publication date: 13 August 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We apply our theory to a rich collection of examples by noting that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of a finite population evolutionary stable strategies.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1003.4277

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zbMATH Keywords

rock-paper-scissorszero-sum gamessaddle pointsingle-peakednessexact potential gamesfinite population evolutionary stable strategyquasiconcavitysymmetric two-player games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cited In (26)

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• The testable implications of zero-sum games
• Pure strategy equilibrium in finite weakly unilaterally competitive games
• The computation of Nash equilibrium in fashion games via semi-tensor product method
• Unbeatable imitation
• Cycles with undistinguished actions and extended rock-paper-scissors games
• Patent Nash equilibria in symmetric strictly competitive games
• Towards multi‐agent reinforcement learning‐driven over‐the‐counter market simulations
• Dynamics of two-person zero-sum games with Boolean strategies and partially given payoff function
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• A connection between von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility and symmetric potential games
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• On two-player games with pure strategies on intervals \([a,b]\) and comparisons with the two-player, two-strategy matrix case
• Stationary, completely mixed and symmetric optimal and equilibrium strategies in stochastic games
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• Two-person pairwise solvable games
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• Stochastic convergence to recurrent state equilibrium for state-based games
• Pure strategy equilibria in a class of systems defense games

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