Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0302-xzbMath1259.91002arXiv1003.4277OpenAlexW3123694393MaRDI QIDQ444136

Burkhard C. Schipper, Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler

Publication date: 13 August 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1003.4277

zbMATH Keywords

zero-sum gamessaddle pointrock-paper-scissorssingle-peakednessexact potential gamesfinite population evolutionary stable strategyquasiconcavitysymmetric two-player games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (15)

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• The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
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