Two-person pairwise solvable games

DOI10.1007/s00182-020-00709-1zbMath1444.91008MaRDI QIDQ776846

Takuya Iimura, Takahiro Watanabe, Toshimasa Maruta

Publication date: 13 July 2020

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00709-1

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium; zero-sum games; interchangeability; dominance solvability; quasiconcavity; evolutionary equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91A11: Equilibrium refinements

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