Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2485zbMath0922.90146OpenAlexW2124775159MaRDI QIDQ1289249

Josef Hofbauer, Gerhard Sorger

Publication date: 27 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2485

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionpotential functionsymmetric two-player games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (18)

A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION ⋮ A survey of static and dynamic potential games ⋮ Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint-Shubik conjecture ⋮ ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY ⋮ Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games ⋮ Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry ⋮ Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example ⋮ An improved algorithm for detecting potential games ⋮ Potential games with continuous player sets ⋮ The logit-response dynamics ⋮ Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games ⋮ Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria ⋮ History versus expectations in economic geography reconsidered ⋮ Rationalizable foresight dynamics ⋮ Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time ⋮ Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria ⋮ Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in \(2 \times 2\) coordination games ⋮ \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.

Cites Work

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