Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.003zbMath1280.91023OpenAlexW1970838984MaRDI QIDQ417710

Mathias Staudigl

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.11.003

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionstochastic stabilityevolutionary game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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