Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms
DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0446-0zbMATH Open1187.91010OpenAlexW2107784908MaRDI QIDQ971893FDOQ971893
Authors: Peter Duersch, Albert Kolb, Jörg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper 
Publication date: 17 May 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0446-0
Recommendations
- Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence
- Can you guess the game you are playing?
- Learning in experimental games
- Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
- Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
learningCournot duopolyfictitious playimitationexperimentsreinforcementinternetstrategic teachingtrial \& error
Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90) Internet topics (68M11) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cites Work
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Potential games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
- The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
- An iterative method of solving a game
- Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly
- Imitation-theory and experimental evidence
- Generality, repetition, and the role of descriptive learning models
- Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
- Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
- Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms
- Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence
- Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior
- Learning from personal experience: One rational gay and the justification of myopia
- A behavioral learning process in games
- Recommended play and correlated equilibria: an experimental study
- Long run equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly.
Cited In (12)
- Imitation dynamics in oligopoly games with heterogeneous players
- Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms
- Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly
- Eureka Learning: heuristics and response time in perfect information games
- Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence
- An initial implementation of the Turing tournament to learning in repeated two-person games
- When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
- Evidential equilibria: heuristics and biases in static games of complete information
- Unbeatable imitation
- Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response
- Can you guess the game you are playing?
- Learning, teaching, and turn taking in the repeated assignment game
This page was built for publication: Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q971893)
