Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3069635 (Why is no real title available?)
- A behavioral learning process in games
- An iterative method of solving a game
- Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior
- Generality, repetition, and the role of descriptive learning models
- Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
- Imitation-theory and experimental evidence
- Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly
- Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence
- Learning from personal experience: One rational gay and the justification of myopia
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Long run equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly.
- Potential games
- Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms
- Recommended play and correlated equilibria: an experimental study
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
- Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior
- The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
- The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
Cited in
(12)- Imitation dynamics in oligopoly games with heterogeneous players
- Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence
- Unbeatable imitation
- An initial implementation of the Turing tournament to learning in repeated two-person games
- Can you guess the game you are playing?
- Evidential equilibria: heuristics and biases in static games of complete information
- When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
- Learning, teaching, and turn taking in the repeated assignment game
- Eureka Learning: heuristics and response time in perfect information games
- Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms
- Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response
- Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly
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