Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2009.06.003zbMath1183.91065MaRDI QIDQ1042725

Burkhard C. Schipper

Publication date: 7 December 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/kG51nPmKvSJ8NaceYhVSXSYi/05-37.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

learning; bounded rationality; Stackelberg; quasisubmodularity; profit maximization hypothesis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B69: Heterogeneous agent models

Related Items

Unbeatable imitation, Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a public good game, Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks, Imitation in Cournot oligopolies with multiple markets, Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms, Quantity competition, endogenous motives and behavioral heterogeneity, When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?, Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations, Beatable imitation in symmetric games with perturbed payoffs

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