Rule evolution and equilibrium selection
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Publication:700128
DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0894zbMATH Open1030.91009OpenAlexW2068991435MaRDI QIDQ700128FDOQ700128
Authors: Wei-Torng Juang 
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0894
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Cites Work
- Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
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- Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
- Adaptive dynamics in games played by heterogeneous populations
Cited In (11)
- Imitation dynamics in oligopoly games with heterogeneous players
- Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly
- Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games
- Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model
- Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a public good game
- Popularity of reinforcement-based and belief-based learning models: an evolutionary approach
- Dynamical Selection Rules
- Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity
- Unbeatable imitation
- Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
- Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response
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