Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model

DOI10.1142/S0219198903001045zbMATH Open1058.91014OpenAlexW2034114249MaRDI QIDQ4433465FDOQ4433465

Authors: Burkhard Hehenkamp 

Publication date: 2003

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045

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zbMATH Keywords

stochastic stabilityequilibrium selectionrisk dominanceEvolutionco-ordination gamesmutation dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies

Cited In (3)

• Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics
• EVOLUTION WITH ENDOGENOUS MUTATIONS
• Rule evolution and equilibrium selection

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