Rule evolution and equilibrium selection

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0894MaRDI QIDQ700128zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wei-Torng Juang

Publication date 30 September 2002

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0894

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionmyopic best responsenaive imitationrule evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Review text

The paper studies rule evolution and its effect on selection between strict equilibria. If the agents cannot change rules, equilibrium selection is determined by the relative frequency of agents making investigations with two rules: the myopic best response and naive imitation. When the agents can only change rules through mutation, the efficient equilibrium weakly dominates the risk-dominant one. If the agents can change rules by updating, then the efficient equilibrium strictly dominates the risk-dominant one.

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Cited in

(12)

• Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly
• Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution
• Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
• Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response
• Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity
• Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games
• Unbeatable imitation
• Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a public good game
• Popularity of reinforcement-based and belief-based learning models: an evolutionary approach
• Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model
• Dynamical Selection Rules
• Imitation dynamics in oligopoly games with heterogeneous players

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