Rule evolution and equilibrium selection

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0894MaRDI QIDQ700128zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wei-Torng Juang

Publication date 30 September 2002

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0894

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionmyopic best responsenaive imitationrule evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3826915 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53571 (Why is no real title available?)
• Adaptive dynamics in games played by heterogeneous populations
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks
• Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The logic of animal conflict
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential

Cited in

(11)

• Imitators and optimizers in Cournot oligopoly
• Imitation dynamics in oligopoly games with heterogeneous players
• Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games
• Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model
• Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a public good game
• Popularity of reinforcement-based and belief-based learning models: an evolutionary approach
• Dynamical Selection Rules
• Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity
• Unbeatable imitation
• Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
• Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response

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