Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2642528
DOI10.1007/s11238-007-9032-8zbMath1206.91003OpenAlexW2060581123MaRDI QIDQ2642528
Publication date: 17 August 2007
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9032-8
Related Items
Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games, Asset market games of survival: a synthesis of evolutionary and dynamic games, An evolutionary finance model with a risk-free asset, Learning across games
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Prudence, justice, benevolence, and sex: Evidence from similar bargaining games
- Rule evolution and equilibrium selection
- ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics
- Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games
- How to play \((3\times 3)\)-games.: A strategy method experiment.
- Regret-based continuous-time dynamics.
- An evolutionary approach to learning in a changing environment.
- Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: Theory and evidence
- Strategic similarity and emergent conventions: evidence from similar stag hunt games
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- Fictitious play by cases
- The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria
- Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games
- Sequences of Games with Varying Opponents
- Evolutionary Games in Economics
- Evolutionary game dynamics
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Prediction, Learning, and Games
- Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
- A general class of adaptive strategies
