Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: Theory and evidence
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Cites work
- A comparison of learning models
- A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability
- Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
- Bayesian learning in normal form games
- Boundedly rational rule learning in a guessing game
- Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games
- Evolution of smart\(_ n\) players
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 43585 (Why is no real title available?)
- Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
- Learning and decision costs in experimental constant sum games
- Learning behavior in an experimental matching pennies game
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
Cited in
(33)- Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
- Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games
- Learning in experimental games
- Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
- Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
- `Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game.
- Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games.
- Does observation influence learning?
- Experiments on individual strategy updating in iterated snowdrift game under random rematching
- Evidence for learning to learn behavior in normal form games
- Aspiration-based and reciprocity-based rules in learning dynamics for symmetric normal-form games
- An axiomatic characterization of Bayes' rule
- On the beliefs off the path: equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-\(k\)
- Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in \(2\times 2\) games
- Replicator based on imitation for finite and arbitrary networked communities
- Meaningful learning and transfer of learning in games played repeatedly without feedback
- Self-tuning experience weighted attraction learning in games
- Hierarchical thinking and learning in rank order contests
- Boundedly rational rule learning in a guessing game
- Game theory-inspired evolutionary algorithm for global optimization
- Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games
- Rule rationality
- Evolution of theories of mind
- Varieties of agents in agent-based computational economics: a historical and an interdisciplinary perspective
- Equilibrium selection under evolutionary game dynamics with optimizing behavior
- An Evaluation of Econometric Models of Adaptive Learning
- Deep and shallow thinking in the long run
- Learning through period and physical time
- Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games
- Naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play in games
- Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
- Coordination and learning behavior in large groups with asymmetric players
- Competing against experienced and inexperienced players
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