Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games

DOI10.1007/S001820050101MaRDI QIDQ1293484zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dale O. Stahl

Publication date 14 June 2000

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050101

zbMATH Keywords

ruleslearningNash equilibriaexperimental

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Experimental studies (91A90) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cited in

(19)

• Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games
• The emergence of coordination in public good games
• Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games.
• Authority and communication in the laboratory
• Deep and shallow thinking in the long run
• Evolution of theories of mind
• An initial implementation of the Turing tournament to learning in repeated two-person games
• Replicator based on imitation for finite and arbitrary networked communities
• Aspiration-based and reciprocity-based rules in learning dynamics for symmetric normal-form games
• Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games
• Evidential equilibria: heuristics and biases in static games of complete information
• Evidence for optimistic and pessimistic behavior in normal-form games
• Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
• Evidence for learning to learn behavior in normal form games
• A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games
• Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: Theory and evidence
• Identification and testing of modes in beliefs
• An axiomatic characterization of Bayes' rule
• Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-\(k\) comparison

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