Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games.
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Publication:1427488
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00125-XzbMATH Open1062.91031OpenAlexW1978696551MaRDI QIDQ1427488FDOQ1427488
Authors: Mark Walker, Jason Shachat 
Publication date: 14 March 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00125-x
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Cites Work
- An experiment to evaluate Bayesian learning of Nash equilibrium play
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
- Bayesian learning in normal form games
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Are People Bayesian? Uncovering Behavioral Strategies
- Learning and decision costs in experimental constant sum games
- Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: Theory and evidence
- Fictitious play: A statistical study of multiple economic experiments
Cited In (20)
- Learning in a multilateral bargaining experiment
- Learning in experimental games
- Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?
- Evidence for learning to learn behavior in normal form games
- Reinforcement-based vs. Belief-based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-information Games
- Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence
- Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: Theory and evidence
- Equilibrium and reinforcement learning in private-information games: An experimental study
- Dynamic learning in a two-person experimental game
- A cognitive hierarchy model of learning in networks
- Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games
- Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models
- An Evaluation of Econometric Models of Adaptive Learning
- Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
- A hidden Markov model for the detection of pure and mixed strategy play in games
- Experimental `beauty contests' with homogeneous and heterogeneous players and with interior and boundary equilibria
- Games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria: An experimental study
- Theories of Learning in Games and Heterogeneity Bias
- An experiment to evaluate Bayesian learning of Nash equilibrium play
- Learning, non-equilibrium beliefs, and non-pecuniary payoffs in an experimental game
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