Unobserved heterogeneity and equilibrium: an experimental study of Bayesian and adaptive learning in normal form games.
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Publication:1427488
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00125-XzbMATH Open1062.91031OpenAlexW1978696551MaRDI QIDQ1427488FDOQ1427488
Publication date: 14 March 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00125-x
Cites Work
- An experiment to evaluate Bayesian learning of Nash equilibrium play
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
- Bayesian learning in normal form games
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Are People Bayesian? Uncovering Behavioral Strategies
- Learning and decision costs in experimental constant sum games
- Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: Theory and evidence
- Fictitious play: A statistical study of multiple economic experiments
Cited In (9)
- Learning in experimental games
- Evidence for learning to learn behavior in normal form games
- Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: Theory and evidence
- Equilibrium and reinforcement learning in private-information games: An experimental study
- Dynamic learning in a two-person experimental game
- Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models
- Experimental `beauty contests' with homogeneous and heterogeneous players and with interior and boundary equilibria
- Games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria: An experimental study
- An experiment to evaluate Bayesian learning of Nash equilibrium play
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