Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
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Cites work
- A payoff uncertainty explanation of results in experimental centipede games
- An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- Consistency and cautious fictitious play
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Cycles of learning in the centipede game
- Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Experience-weighted attraction learning in sender-receiver signaling games
- Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
- Learning and decision costs in experimental constant sum games
- Learning behavior in an experimental matching pennies game
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- On the centipede game
- Predicting how people play games: A simple dynamic model of choice
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Reinforcement-based vs. Belief-based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-information Games
- Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: Theory and evidence
- The effects of financial incentives in experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework. (With commentaries)
Cited in
(13)- Incremental approaches to establishing trust
- Theoretical tools for understanding and aiding dynamic decision making
- Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation
- King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot
- ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game
- Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
- Bid pooling in reverse multi-unit Dutch auctions: an experimental investigation
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- BACKWARD INDUCTION OR FORWARD REASONING? – AN EXPERIMENT OF STOCHASTIC ALTERNATING OFFER BARGAINING
- Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
- High-stakes failures of backward induction
- Why do children pass in the centipede game? Cognitive limitations v. risk calculations
- A note on the equilibria of the unbounded traveler's dilemma
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