Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
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Publication:1399516
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00009-5zbMath1047.91507WikidataQ56482320 ScholiaQ56482320MaRDI QIDQ1399516
Thomas E. Nicholas, William E. Stein, Amnon Rapoport, James E. Parco
Publication date: 30 July 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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