Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games

DOI10.1007/s001820050101zbMath0937.91028MaRDI QIDQ1293484

Dale O. II Stahl

Publication date: 14 June 2000

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050101

zbMATH Keywords

rules; learning; Nash equilibria; experimental

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A80: Applications of game theory

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

91A90: Experimental studies

Related Items

Evolution of theories of mind, Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games, Identification and testing of modes in beliefs, Authority and communication in the laboratory, An initial implementation of the Turing tournament to learning in repeated two-person games, The emergence of coordination in public good games, Evidence for optimistic and pessimistic behavior in normal-form games, Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game., Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games., Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: Theory and evidence, Evidence for learning to learn behavior in normal form games, Aspiration-based and reciprocity-based rules in learning dynamics for symmetric normal-form games, An axiomatic characterization of Bayes' rule, Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games