Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games
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Publication:1293484
DOI10.1007/S001820050101zbMATH Open0937.91028OpenAlexW2009872003MaRDI QIDQ1293484FDOQ1293484
Authors: Dale O. Stahl 
Publication date: 14 June 2000
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050101
Recommendations
Applications of game theory (91A80) Experimental studies (91A90) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Cited In (19)
- Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games
- Identification and testing of modes in beliefs
- Evolution of theories of mind
- Aspiration-based and reciprocity-based rules in learning dynamics for symmetric normal-form games
- A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games
- The emergence of coordination in public good games
- Deep and shallow thinking in the long run
- An initial implementation of the Turing tournament to learning in repeated two-person games
- Evidence for learning to learn behavior in normal form games
- Rule learning in symmetric normal-form games: Theory and evidence
- Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-\(k\) comparison
- Evidential equilibria: heuristics and biases in static games of complete information
- An axiomatic characterization of Bayes' rule
- Authority and communication in the laboratory
- Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games
- Replicator based on imitation for finite and arbitrary networked communities
- Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
- Evidence for optimistic and pessimistic behavior in normal-form games
- Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games.
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