Boundedly rational rule learning in a guessing game
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Publication:2564872
DOI10.1006/game.1996.0088zbMath0863.90140OpenAlexW2018552538MaRDI QIDQ2564872
Publication date: 7 January 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0088
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