On the beliefs off the path: equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-k

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.002MaRDI QIDQ2016224zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yves Breitmoser, Jonathan H. W. Tan, Daniel John Zizzo

Publication date 19 June 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

experimentquantal responseincomplete informationlevel-\(k\)rationalizabilitylogit equilibriumequilibrium refinementinequity aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Evolution of beliefs and the Nash equilibrium of normal form games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Regular quantal response equilibrium
• Heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium and cognitive hierarchies

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3926050 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
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• Sequential Equilibria
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• p-Dominance and Belief Potential

Cited in

(5)

• Coordinated democracy
• Inequality and inter-group conflicts: experimental evidence
• Predicting human behavior in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games
• Experience in public goods experiments
• Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Gambit
• NEWUOA

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