On the beliefs off the path: equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-k
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.002zbMATH Open1294.91022OpenAlexW2238507798MaRDI QIDQ2016224FDOQ2016224
Authors: Yves Breitmoser, Jonathan H. W. Tan, Daniel John Zizzo 
Publication date: 19 June 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.002
Recommendations
experimentquantal responseincomplete informationlevel-\(k\)rationalizabilitylogit equilibriumequilibrium refinementinequity aversion
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