On the beliefs off the path: equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-\(k\)
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Publication:2016224
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.002zbMath1294.91022MaRDI QIDQ2016224
Daniel John Zizzo, Jonathan H. W. Tan, Yves Breitmoser
Publication date: 19 June 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.002
experiment; equilibrium refinement; logit equilibrium; incomplete information; quantal response; rationalizability; level-\(k\); inequity aversion
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