Evolution of beliefs and the Nash equilibrium of normal form games

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0098zbMATH Open0871.90133OpenAlexW2010520011MaRDI QIDQ2365337FDOQ2365337

Authors: Masaki Aoyagi 

Publication date: 23 February 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0098

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zbMATH Keywords

pattern recognitionmixed-strategy Nash equilibriumtwo-person model of learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Cited In (15)

• Learning in Games
• Redefinition of belief distorted Nash equilibria for the environment of dynamic games with probabilistic beliefs
• Beyond fictitious play beliefs: incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
• Learning purified mixed equilibria
• Normative conspiracy theory
• Conditional universal consistency.
• Violations of monotonicity in evolutionary models with sample-based beliefs
• Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response
• On the beliefs off the path: equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-\(k\)
• Learning from personal experience: One rational gay and the justification of myopia
• Normative conspiracy theory

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