Violations of monotonicity in evolutionary models with sample-based beliefs

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.01.009zbMATH Open1398.91069OpenAlexW3122994371MaRDI QIDQ1672873FDOQ1672873

Authors: Richard D. Ball 

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.009

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zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityevolutionreplicator dynamicssample-based beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory for games (91A35) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• The logic of animal conflict
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• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
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• Learning by forgetful players
• Adaptive play with spatial sampling.
• Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory

Cited In (1)

• Evolutionary justifications for non-Bayesian beliefs

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