Learning by forgetful players
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Publication:1906716
DOI10.1006/game.1995.1053zbMath0841.90126OpenAlexW1984980284MaRDI QIDQ1906716
Publication date: 24 July 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/815674866ab95b8dbc67773731c1e4a3d3fb8e3d
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Noncooperative games (91A10) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)
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