Stochastic imitation in finite games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.01.004zbMath1093.91010OpenAlexW3124542930MaRDI QIDQ705867

Jens Josephson, Alexander Matros

Publication date: 16 February 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0363.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (6)

Regret matching with finite memory ⋮ Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame. ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Robust stochastic stability ⋮ Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations ⋮ The Price of Stochastic Anarchy

Cites Work

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• Which one should I imitate?
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• Learning by forgetful players
• Non-cooperative games
• Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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