An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction

DOI10.1006/GAME.1993.1024zbMath0820.90144OpenAlexW2066173798MaRDI QIDQ1308822

Publication date: 10 December 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4538.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibrium mutations dynamic evolutionary process limiting outcomes locally stable outcomes stochastic learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (60J05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

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