Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00502-XzbMath1032.91027OpenAlexW2157815725MaRDI QIDQ1864824

Sergiu Hart

Publication date: 23 March 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00502-x

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumevolutionary stabilityselectionbackward inductionevolutionary dynamicsmutationsubgame-perfect equilibriumpopulation gamesgames in extensive formgames of perfect informationinduction equilibriumNash equilibrium state

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (15)

The evolution of parental investment: re-examining the anisogamy argument ⋮ Cooperate without looking in a non-repeated game ⋮ A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory ⋮ The evolution of exchange. ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Best response dynamics with level-\(n\) expectations in two-stage games ⋮ On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations ⋮ Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information ⋮ Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games ⋮ RULE RATIONALITY ⋮ Deterministic approximation of best-response dynamics for the matching pennies game ⋮ Learning efficient equilibria in repeated games ⋮ Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation ⋮ Stochastic stability in the large population and small mutation limits for coordination games ⋮ Evolutionary exploration of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma -- the effect of out-of-equilibrium play

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Adaptive learning in extensive form games and sequential equilibrium
• The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games
• Fictitious play in extensive form games
• Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

This page was built for publication: Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction