Cooperate without looking in a non-repeated game

DOI10.3390/g6040458zbMath1402.91043OpenAlexW1842983596MaRDI QIDQ1651819

Christian Hilbe, Martin A. Nowak, Moshe Hoffman

Publication date: 10 July 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040458

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationevolutionary game theoryemotionsprincipled behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests

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