Local replicator dynamics: a simple link between deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory
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Publication:644478
DOI10.1007/s11538-010-9608-2zbMath1225.92043WikidataQ50652469 ScholiaQ50652469MaRDI QIDQ644478
Publication date: 4 November 2011
Published in: Bulletin of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11538-010-9608-2
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