Effective game matrix and inclusive payoff in group-structured populations

DOI10.1007/S13235-011-0014-7zbMATH Open1261.91007OpenAlexW1979707124MaRDI QIDQ692091FDOQ692091

Authors: Sabin Lessard 

Publication date: 4 December 2012

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0014-7

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zbMATH Keywords

relatednessgroup selectionmatrix gameinclusive fitnessevolutionary gamefinite-island model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• The coalescent
• Relatedness and inclusive fitness with inbreeding
• Kin selection and coefficients of relatedness in family-structured populations with inbreeding
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• The sampling theory of selectively neutral alleles
• The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
• Evolution of cooperation by phenotypic similarity
• Diffusion approximations for one-locus multi-allele kin selection, mutation and random drift in group-structured populations: a unifying approach to selection models in population genetics
• Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory
• Local replicator dynamics: a simple link between deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Separation of time scales, fixation probabilities and convergence to evolutionarily stable states under isolation by distance

Cited In (15)

• Aspiration can promote cooperation in well-mixed populations as in regular graphs
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation
• First-order effect of frequency-dependent selection on fixation probability in an age-structured population with application to a public goods game
• Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates in finite population
• Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortment in finite populations
• Frequency-dependent growth in class-structured populations: continuous dynamics in the limit of weak selection
• Strong migration limit for games in structured populations: applications to dominance hierarchy and set structure
• Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
• Conditions for cooperation to be more abundant than defection in a hierarchically structured population
• Evolution of cooperation in a multidimensional phenotype space
• Hamilton's rule
• Replicator based on imitation for finite and arbitrary networked communities
• Inclusive fitness and Hamilton's rule in a stochastic environment
• One, Two, Many—Insensitivity to Group Size in Games with Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs
• Assortment by group founders always promotes the evolution of cooperation under global selection but can oppose it under local selection

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