Effective game matrix and inclusive payoff in group-structured populations
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Publication:692091
DOI10.1007/S13235-011-0014-7zbMATH Open1261.91007OpenAlexW1979707124MaRDI QIDQ692091FDOQ692091
Authors: Sabin Lessard
Publication date: 4 December 2012
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0014-7
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Cites Work
- The coalescent
- Relatedness and inclusive fitness with inbreeding
- Kin selection and coefficients of relatedness in family-structured populations with inbreeding
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Evolutionary game dynamics
- The sampling theory of selectively neutral alleles
- The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
- Evolution of cooperation by phenotypic similarity
- Diffusion approximations for one-locus multi-allele kin selection, mutation and random drift in group-structured populations: a unifying approach to selection models in population genetics
- Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory
- Local replicator dynamics: a simple link between deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Separation of time scales, fixation probabilities and convergence to evolutionarily stable states under isolation by distance
Cited In (15)
- Aspiration can promote cooperation in well-mixed populations as in regular graphs
- Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation
- First-order effect of frequency-dependent selection on fixation probability in an age-structured population with application to a public goods game
- Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates in finite population
- Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortment in finite populations
- Frequency-dependent growth in class-structured populations: continuous dynamics in the limit of weak selection
- Strong migration limit for games in structured populations: applications to dominance hierarchy and set structure
- Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
- Conditions for cooperation to be more abundant than defection in a hierarchically structured population
- Evolution of cooperation in a multidimensional phenotype space
- Hamilton's rule
- Replicator based on imitation for finite and arbitrary networked communities
- Inclusive fitness and Hamilton's rule in a stochastic environment
- One, Two, Many—Insensitivity to Group Size in Games with Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs
- Assortment by group founders always promotes the evolution of cooperation under global selection but can oppose it under local selection
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