Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortment in finite populations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6594263
Recommendations
- Assortment and the evolution of cooperation in a Moran process with exponential fitness
- Assortment by group founders always promotes the evolution of cooperation under global selection but can oppose it under local selection
- Evolution of cooperation in finite populations
- Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortative interactions
- Evolution of cooperation with respect to fixation probabilities in multi-player games with random payoffs
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3493681 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3273551 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3048438 (Why is no real title available?)
- Assortment by group founders always promotes the evolution of cooperation under global selection but can oppose it under local selection
- Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
- Diffusion approximations for one-locus multi-allele kin selection, mutation and random drift in group-structured populations: a unifying approach to selection models in population genetics
- Direct reciprocity in structured populations
- Effective game matrix and inclusive payoff in group-structured populations
- Evolution of cooperation by phenotypic similarity
- Evolution of cooperation in finite populations
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Kin selection and coefficients of relatedness in family-structured populations with inbreeding
- Mathematical population genetics. I: Theoretical introduction.
- On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game
- Relatedness and inclusive fitness with inbreeding
- Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment
- The evolution of cooperation
- The long-run behavior of the stochastic replicator dynamics
- The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
- The volunteer's dilemma and the optimal size of a social group
This page was built for publication: Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortment in finite populations
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6594263)