Direct reciprocity in structured populations

DOI10.1073/pnas.1206694109zbMath1355.91062OpenAlexW2145017102WikidataQ36056508 ScholiaQ36056508MaRDI QIDQ2962140

Matthijs van Veelen, Julián García, David G. Rand, Martin A. Nowaka

Publication date: 16 February 2017

Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1206694109

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Related Items (35)

The impact of expressing willingness to cooperate on cooperation in public goods game ⋮ Evolutionary games and matching rules ⋮ The mechanics of stochastic slowdown in evolutionary games ⋮ Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games ⋮ Sequential interactions -- in which one player plays first and another responds -- promote cooperation in evolutionary-dynamical simulations of single-shot prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games ⋮ Group-level events are catalysts in the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Quantifying the impact of noise on macroscopic organization of cooperation in spatial games ⋮ Hamilton's rule ⋮ Assortment and the evolution of cooperation in a Moran process with exponential fitness ⋮ A game-theoretical dynamic imitation model on networks ⋮ Third-party punishment as a costly signal of high continuation probabilities in repeated games ⋮ Evolution of cooperation through aspiration-based adjustment of interaction range in spatial prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ When and how does mutation-generated variation promote the evolution of cooperation? ⋮ Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on graphs and social networks with external constraint ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs ⋮ Assortment by group founders always promotes the evolution of cooperation under global selection but can oppose it under local selection ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting. ⋮ Evolution and the ultimatum game ⋮ Global migration can lead to stronger spatial selection than local migration ⋮ Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions ⋮ The evolution of collaboration in symmetric \(2\times 2\)-games with imperfect recognition of types ⋮ The evolution of reputation-based cooperation in regular networks ⋮ Density games ⋮ Social exclusion with dynamic cost on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games ⋮ Games among relatives revisited ⋮ The evolutionary advantage of limited network knowledge ⋮ Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible ⋮ Evil green beards: tag recognition can also be used to withhold cooperation in structured populations ⋮ Evolving cooperation in spatial population with punishment by using PSO algorithm ⋮ Ranking game on networks: the evolution of hierarchical society ⋮ Limit Cycles Sparked by Mutation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional games and monitoring of interactions between defectors ⋮ Eco-evolutionary spatial dynamics of nonlinear social dilemmas ⋮ Evolutionary multiplayer games ⋮ Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions

Cites Work

• Robustness against indirect invasions
• Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
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• The importance of being discrete (and spatial)
• Evolutionarily stable strategies in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Strategy selection in structured populations
• Group selection, kin selection, altruism and cooperation: when inclusive fitness is right and when it can be wrong
• Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
• The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Types of evolutionary stability and the problem of cooperation.
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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