The evolution of reputation-based cooperation in regular networks
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Publication:725086
DOI10.3390/G8010008zbMATH Open1407.91033arXiv1701.06153OpenAlexW3098954346WikidataQ57712134 ScholiaQ57712134MaRDI QIDQ725086FDOQ725086
Tatsuya Sasaki, Isamu Okada, Satoshi Uchida, Hitoshi Yamamoto
Publication date: 1 August 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Despite recent advances in reputation technologies, it is not clear how reputation systems can affect human cooperation in social networks. Although it is known that two of the major mechanisms in the evolution of cooperation are spatial selection and reputation-based reciprocity, theoretical study of the interplay between both mechanisms remains almost uncharted. Here, we present a new individual-based model for the evolution of reciprocal cooperation between reputation and networks. We comparatively analyze four of the leading moral assessment rules---shunning, image scoring, stern judging, and simple standing---and base the model on the giving game in regular networks for Cooperators, Defectors, and Discriminators. Discriminators rely on a proper moral assessment rule. By using individual-based models, we show that the four assessment rules are differently characterized in terms of how cooperation evolves, depending on the benefit-to-cost ratio, the network-node degree, and the observation and error conditions. Our findings show that the most tolerant rule---simple standing---is the most robust among the four assessment rules in promoting cooperation in regular networks.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1701.06153
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Cited In (6)
- Investigating the co-evolution of node reputation and edge-strategy in prisoner's dilemma game
- Evolution of equity norms in small-world networks
- A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity
- Effect of memory, intolerance, and second-order reputation on cooperation
- Impact of reputation assortment on tag-mediated altruistic behaviors in the spatial lattice
- Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model
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